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Abstract 
 
Differences between men and women have intrigued generations of social scientists, who have 
found that the two sexes behave differently in settings requiring competition, risk taking, 
altruism, honesty, as well as many others. Yet, little is known about whether there are gender 
differences in cooperative behavior. Previous evidence is mixed and inconclusive. Here I shed 
light on this topic by analyzing the totality of studies that my research group has conducted since 
2013. This is a dataset of 10,951 observations coming from 7,322 men and women living in the 
US, recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, and who passed four comprehension questions 
to make sure they understand the cooperation problem (a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma). The 
analysis demonstrates that women are more cooperative than men. The effect size is small (about 
4 percentage points, and this might explain why previous studies failed to detect it) but highly 
significant (p<.0001). 
 
Keywords: gender differences, cooperation, sex differences, prisoner’s dilemma 
Introduction 
 
Differences between men and women have intrigued generations of social scientists. Men, for 
example, have been found to be more competitive (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2006) and more risk 
seeking than women (Eckel & Grossman, 2008); whereas women have been found to be more 
honest (Abeler, Nosenzo & Raymond, in press; Capraro, 2017) and more altruistic than men 
(Brañas-Garza, Capraro, Rascón-Ramírez, 2018), especially when acting intuitively (Rand et al, 
2016). Gender differences have also been found in moral judgments, where women typically 
make more deontological judgments in emotional dilemmas than men do (Friesdorf, Conway & 
Gawronski, 2015). There are gender differences in expectations too. Women are expected to be 
communal and unselfish, while men are expected to be agentic and independent (Eagly, 1987). 
And it has been observed that these differential expectations can have negative consequences on 
how people of different sex are judged when making the same action. For example, Heilman and 
Chen (2005) found that women are punished more than men when they fail to act altruistically. 
 
Despite all this research, little is known about gender differences in cooperative behavior. 
Cooperation, that is, paying a cost to give a greater benefit to another person (or a group of 
people), while expecting the other person (or group of people) doing the same, is considered by 
many to be one of the behaviors that fundamentally characterize us, humans, as a species (Boyd, 
Gintis, Bowles & Richerson, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Perc et al, 2017; Rand & Nowak, 
2013). Some psychologists and anthropologists have advanced the hypothesis that the 
psychological mechanism underlying cooperative behavior, shared intentionality, might be the 
single trait that makes humans uniquely humans, since it is possessed by (non-autistic) children 
but not by great apes (Tomasello et al, 2015). It is thus undebatable that understanding whether 
there are gender differences in cooperative behavior is of primary importance. The question is 
also theoretically non-trivial, since both women and men have been adopting cooperative 
strategies since our hunter-gatherer ancestors (e.g., allomothering, hunting). 
 
Numerous studies have tried to answer this question. See Croson and Gneezy (2009) for an 
exhaustive list of references. In short, the evidence is mixed and inconclusive. The literature 
offers examples in which men cooperate more than women (e.g., Rapoport & Chammah, 1965), 
examples in which women cooperate more than men (e.g., Frank, Gilovich & Regan, 1993), and 
examples in which there are no gender differences (e.g., Sell, Griffith & Wilson, 1993).  
 
However, that previous studies failed to consistently detect gender differences in cooperative 
behavior does not necessarily mean that there are no gender differences. An alternative could be 
that gender differences are small and cannot be detected using the limited power of classical 
experiments conducted in physical laboratories. To shed light on this topic, I thus analyze the 
totality of experiments conducted by my research group and which use one-shot anonymous 
Prisoner’s dilemma games, the standard measure of cooperative behavior among strangers 
(Nowak, 2006). This dataset contains 10,951 choices made by 7,322 men and women living in 
the US at the time of the experiments. The large size makes this dataset an excellent test for the 
hypothesis that there might be small gender differences in cooperative behavior, which previous 
studies failed to detect because of insufficient power. The following analysis indeed 
demonstrates that women cooperate more than men (49.7% vs 45.2%). Not surprisingly, the 
effect is very small. However, it is highly significant (p<.0001).  
 
 
Method 
 
I analyze the entire set of experiments conducted by my research group and using the one-shot 
Prisoner’s dilemma game. In these Prisoner’s dilemma games, two players are matched 
anonymously over the Internet and they are shown the same set of instructions. They are given a 
certain amount of money (between $0.10 and $0.50 in my experiments) and they are asked 
whether they want to transfer (part of) this endowment to the other player.  Any amount 
transferred is multiplied by a factor larger than 1 (between 1.1 and 10 in my experiments) and 
earned by the other player. The fact that the multiplier is larger than 1 implies that the two 
players are better off if they both transfer the money to each other than if they both keep it. 
However, each player has an individual incentive to keep the money. Thus, the Prisoner’s 
dilemma captures the essence of the social dilemma of cooperation (Nowak, 2006). 
 
Since 2013, my research group has conducted 31 studies using one-shot Prisoner’s dilemma 
games. Some use a binary Prisoner’s dilemma, where players can either transfer the whole 
endowment, or nothing; others use a (quasi)-continuous Prisoner’s dilemma, in which players 
can transfer any amount from 0 to the whole endowment. Thus, the dependent variable will be a 
(quasi)-continuous variable called Cooperation normalized such that it takes value 1 if a subject 
transferred the full endowment. The combined dataset contains 10,951 observations collected on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014) from individuals living in the US at the 
time of the experiment. All subjects passed four comprehension questions. One question asked 
which choice maximizes the player’s payoff; one question asked which choice maximizes the 
other player’s payoff; one question asked which choice by the other player maximizes the first 
player’s payoff; one question asked which choice by the other player maximizes the other 
player’s payoff. Thus, the subjects that I am going to analyze have a clear and complete 
understanding of the social dilemma structure of the game.  
 
Results 
 
As a first step, I analyze the set of unique observations. To build this dataset, I start from the 
10,951 observations in the combined dataset, and I check for multiple IP addresses and multiple 
TurkIDs. In doing so, I find 7,322 “unique” observations (mean age = 32.09). For each multiple 
observation, I keep only the first one, as determined by the date of participation in the 
experiment. In this dataset, simple average comparison shows that women cooperate slightly 
more than men (49.7% vs 45.2%). See Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Women are significantly more cooperative than men. N=7,322. Error bars = ± SEM 
 
Linear regression predicting Cooperation as a function of Female confirms the existence of a 
highly significant effect (coeff = 0.044, t=4.06, p<.0001). This effect is robust after controlling 
for age and education (coeff=0.0388, t=3.52, p<.0001).  
 
As a second step, I conduct a meta-analysis of the 31 studies using the metan command in Stata. 
The forest plot is reported in Figure 2. There is a highly significant overall effect (overall effect 
size = 0.036, 95% CI [0.015, 0.057], z= 3.41, p=0.001), which is robust after controlling for age 
and level of education (overall effect size: 0.029, 95% CI [0.008, 0.050], z=2.73, p=0.006).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Forest plot of the meta-analysis of the effects of sex on cooperative behavior on the 31 
studies conducted by my research group. There is a significant overall effect such that women 
are more cooperative than men. 
 
I have also conducted a series of robustness checks. Instead of keeping, in case of multiple 
observations, only the first one, I have repeated the analysis by keeping the mean value of all 
choices from the same subject. Then I have repeated the analysis by keeping all observations, 
and treating them as independent. Finally, instead of splitting the dataset by “study”, I repeated 
the meta-analysis by splitting the dataset by treatment. The result that women are significantly 
more cooperative than men is robust across all these specifications. 
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Conclusion 
 
Previous work on gender differences in cooperative behavior has been inconclusive. Here I shed 
light on this topic by analyzing a dataset of more than 10,000 observations on one-shot 
Prisoner’s dilemma games played online by people living in the US. The analysis demonstrates 
that women are more cooperative than men. The effect is small (about 4 percentage points), and 
this might explain why previous studies failed to detect it. However, it is highly significant, and 
thus theoretically, if not practically, important.  
 
These results have obvious limitations. They regard a specific population (MTurk workers living 
in the US) in a context in which cooperating is cheap (cost of cooperation between $0.10 and 
$0.50). Thus, one important direction for future research is to investigate the stability of gender 
differences in cooperative behavior across societies and for significantly larger stakes. Moreover, 
these results are silent regarding the theoretical mechanism underlying the revealed effect, and its 
potential practical consequences on real-life interactions. For example, are women punished 
more than men when failing to act cooperatively? These are important questions that need to be 
addressed in future research.  
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